


Field Notes, First Drafts, & Foreign Correspondence
Daily Brief: 30 Afghans Killed in Kandahar Roadside Bomb, Katherine Tiedemann, AfPak Channel/Foreign Policy
You Don’t ALWAYS Have to Escalate, Joshua Foust, Registan.net
Balkh Power Struggle Leaves Locals Fearful, Ahmad Kawoosh, Institute for War & Peace Reporting
Ballot Uncertainty Fuels Cynicism in Helmand, Mohammad Ilyas Dayee, Institute for War & Peace Reporting
First Strategic Flight in Support of ISAF, NATO Newsroom
Now Playing in Swat, Jason Tanner, At War/New York Times
George Packer’s profile of Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, provides some interesting material to chew on. Packer’s two main themes are Holbrooke’s force of character – he has a large ego and big personality, and overwhelms everything he does with sheer will and determination – and the lessons of Vietnam. Interestingly, Vietnam is where Holbrooke first cut his diplomatic teeth in the early 1960s; but it hasn’t been that long since Dayton and Bosnia, historical events that have more direct bearing on my own life and with which I more directly associate Holbrooke. It’s Vietnam, not Bosnia, though, that appears to be shaping everything Holbrooke is now doing – or rather, that’s what informs how he thinks about what he’s doing now. At least that’s how he sees things, as Packer describes it. Holbrooke is not and refuses to be shackled by the ghosts of Vietnam; there’s a blatant irony in the pervasiveness of that refusal… not that Holbrooke is actually in denial about it. More that it’s such a large part of why and how he does things, that it can’t help but shape who he is and what he does.
Now this is interesting:
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — As American troops move deeper into southern Afghanistan to fight Taliban insurgents, U.S. officials are expressing new concerns about the role of fugitive Taliban leader Mohammad Omar and his council of lieutenants, who reportedly plan and launch cross-border strikes from safe havens around the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta.
But U.S. officials acknowledge they know relatively little about the remote and arid Pakistani border region, have no capacity to strike there, and have few windows into the turbulent mix of Pashtun tribal and religious politics that has turned the area into a sanctuary for the Taliban leaders, who are known collectively as the Quetta Shura.
Pakistani officials, in turn, have been accused of allowing the Taliban movement to regroup in the Quetta area, viewing it as a strategic asset rather than a domestic threat, while the army has been heavily focused on curbing violent Islamist extremists in the northwest border region hundreds of miles away.
As a result, Pakistani and foreign analysts here said, Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province, has suddenly emerged as an urgent but elusive new target as Washington grapples with the Taliban’s rapidly spreading arc of influence and terror across Afghanistan.
According to Anne W. Patterson, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, “In the past, we focused on al-Qaeda because they were a threat to us. The Quetta Shura mattered less to us because we had no troops in the region… Now our troops are there on the other side of the border, and the Quetta Shura is high on Washington’s list.”
The Taliban Quetta shura has always been a recognized problem. Well, maybe not always, since that’s a pretty long time. But it’s certainly been recognized as a significant part – maybe the most significant part – of the Taliban command and control structure for a good long while.
Bernard Finel is right about this: it’s about new priorities, not new facts. It’s about McChrystal going for the Taliban throat. The problem with Quetta is that it isn’t in Afghanistan; and with the NATO mission in Afghanistan, is that its remit stops at the Durand Line, regardless of how significant a problem cross-border sanctuaries might be. So, if we’re getting serious about this, we might have something more to look forward to than just drone strikes; think more along the lines of the B-52 strikes into Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War.
UPDATE: I exaggerate slightly… but I do wonder what getting serious about something like Quetta would involve. There’s room, I think, for serious comparison of the costs and consequences of cross-border escalation.
Al Qaeda’s New Charm Offensive in Europe, Bruce Riedel, Up Front/Brookings Institution
An Absolutely Horrifying Interview, Bernard Finel, Bernardfinel.com
The Last Mission, George Packer, New Yorker
Andrew Bacevich and the Cold War Analogy, Peter Feaver, Shadow Government/Foreign Policy
On Hizballah’s Strategy, Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama
The Wrong Question, Caroline Wadhams, AfPak Channel/Foreign Policy