Flipping the COIN

Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies,  raises a few interesting points about counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan. “Counterinsurgency doctrine, or COIN,” he writes, “has captured the hearts and minds of many in the D.C. policy community. Upon close inspection, however, it becomes clear that COIN, at least as applied to Afghanistan, is built on a number of shaky assumptions.”

Hmmm, way to take a swipe at CNAS. I especially like this one:

…the COIN framework is built on the larger assumption that eliminating the Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan is the best use of American resources in the broader effort to combat terrorism. Al Qaeda’s presence in a pre-9/11, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has convinced many officials that a Taliban takeover would result in al Qaeda’s inevitable return to the state. But al Qaeda already has established itself in Pakistan’s semi-governed spaces. Along with Taliban and other extremist militants, the group enjoys the relative safety of these territories, where Pakistani sovereignty precludes any substantive U.S. ground force. Even if al Qaeda were to reenter Afghanistan sometime in the future, the United States would face the same basic terrorist threats that it does today. Critics will argue that Afghanistan served as a base and planning center for 9/11. True enough; but al Qaeda, in establishing a presence in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen has already developed numerous “safe havens.” In short, our overwhelming focus on Afghanistan fails to serve a more nuanced counterterrorism strategy that acknowledges the many other areas in which al Qaeda operates.

I’ve always maintained that a state-centric approach to networked transnational threats  – interventions that focus on fixing weak and failing states – is a fool’s errand. Nelson explains why pretty clearly, I think. Not that states are irrelevant; simply that the way armed non-state actors distribute their resources generally runs counter to – or more precisely flows around –  the organization of large footprint missions. 

Go read the rest.

Omnivore 01/10/09

Towards a New Strategic Concept For NATO, Klaus Wittman, NATO Defense College

The Evolution of Armed Groups, David H. Sacko et al., SSRN Conflict Studies Abstracts

Analyzing Australia’s Public Sphere Initiative, Palantir Staff, Analysis Blog/Palantir Government

HASC Assessment of the Human Terrain System, Editors, Small Wars Journal

Pentagon Pushes For Unblinking Surveillance, Christian Lowe, Defense Tech

Surveillance State “A Good Thing”, Brian Wheeler, BBC News

Obama and McChrystal Don’t Talk? Good, Says Army Historian, Noah Schachtman, Danger Room/Wired

Omnivore 30/09/09

Daily Brief: 30 Afghans Killed in Kandahar Roadside Bomb, Katherine Tiedemann, AfPak Channel/Foreign Policy

You Don’t ALWAYS Have to Escalate, Joshua Foust, Registan.net

Balkh Power Struggle Leaves Locals Fearful, Ahmad Kawoosh, Institute for War & Peace Reporting

Ballot Uncertainty Fuels Cynicism in Helmand, Mohammad Ilyas Dayee, Institute for War & Peace Reporting

First Strategic Flight in Support of ISAF, NATO Newsroom

Now Playing in Swat, Jason Tanner, At War/New York Times

Ghosts of Vietnam

George Packer’s profile of Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, provides some interesting material to chew on. Packer’s two main themes are Holbrooke’s force of character – he has a large ego and big personality, and overwhelms everything he does with sheer will and determination – and the lessons of Vietnam. Interestingly, Vietnam is where Holbrooke first cut his diplomatic teeth in the early 1960s;  but it hasn’t been that long since Dayton and Bosnia, historical events that have more direct bearing on my own life  and with which I more directly associate Holbrooke. It’s Vietnam, not Bosnia, though, that appears to be shaping everything Holbrooke is now doing – or rather,  that’s what informs how he thinks about what he’s doing now. At least that’s how he sees things, as Packer describes it. Holbrooke is not and refuses to be shackled by the ghosts of Vietnam; there’s a blatant irony in the pervasiveness of that refusal…  not that Holbrooke is actually in denial about it. More that it’s such a large part of why and how he does things, that it can’t help but shape who he is and what he does.