I’m watching Rory Stewart’s narration of the life of Lawrence (yes, that Lawrence). On difficult terrain: can’t patrol it with small units, because those units can then be ambushed; can’t garrison it, because units there couldn’t be resupplied. So much of it remains empty, most of the time, “and an empty space on the map is a dangerous thing.”
Tag: Afghanistan
Message to Exum: Political Endorsement Doesn’t Make it Right
I’ve been following with interest some of the discussion of MGen Michael Flynn’s views on intelligence reform for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. It revisits the debate on civil-military relations that came up back in September when Flynn’s ISAF boss, General Stanley McChrystal, was publicly lobbying for his population-centric campaign plan before the White House had approved it. It also gets into some of the finer points of intelligence procedures and analysis. Much of the punditry, though, is simply missing the point that there are serious problems with the substance of the report, that go beyond just the relative merits of the fora through which it was publicly released – like how it was prepared, who it’s actually directed at, it’s ultimate impact on the mission, etc. Those problems extend far beyond the issues picked up by US commentators, who appear to be blissfully unaware of the impact on their friends and allies. I’m preparing something in-depth, or at least a bit more thoughtful than this brief missive, but for now, I’ll just draw attention to Andrew Exum’s profoundly misguided view that ex post facto political endorsement of Flynn’s actions somehow cancels out the problems of form that accompany the report’s release.
More to follow.
Omnivore 08/01/2010
- A Sobering Statistic For Aspiring Academics // Savage Minds
- On the Gulf Between Academia and Journalism // Daniel Bennett
- Journalism Academics Must Learn From Multimedia Reporters // Tim Luckhurst
- Measuring the Impact of Charisma // (via) MIT Media Lab
- Google Applies to Become Power Marketer // NYT
- Crisis? What Crisis? // Abu Muqawama
Afghan Hands – The Blog
A little over a week ago, I made a return visit to the ISAF webpages to poke around. It looks like some changes have been in the works. The website, which was pretty static before, is all swish now, and comes equipped with a social media dashboard in the footer where readers can subscribe to Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr (but no Twitter) feeds. It’s also got a new Afghan Hands blog, which carries “updates from Leaders and Troops across Afghanistan”.
So far, though, it looks like ISAF has only partially embraced the vigorous public diplomacy ethic espoused by NATO SecGen Anders Fogh Rassmussen and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral Jim Stavridis. Judging by the content of the few posts that are already up at Afghan Hands, ISAF is using this as essentially press-release-by-another-name, which is completely redundant, not to mention unnecessary: officially sanctioned, edited, and command-vetted information can be and is readily pushed to the web in other formats, and pushing it as blog content when it’s not doesn’t add credibility. If anything, in the realm of social media, it demonstrates limited understanding of appropriate and convincing uses of such technologies. There’s also no date-time stamp on individual entries, which is a small point but just as fundamental, and bad practice in any domain of publishing, whether it’s public affairs/public information, blogging, intelligence, or what have you.
To my note to ISAF Public Affairs suggesting that a date-time stamp would be really helpful, no reply. I’m going to assume for now that these are all just growing pains, and that the wrinkles are still being ironed out. NATO and ISAF are in a position to make the Afghan Hands blog a welcome and authoritative hub for information and discussion. It would be disappointing, to say the least, if they don’t make the most of an otherwise golden opportunity – and more than a little ironic, given recent arguments from MGen Mike Flynn, the ISAF intelligence chief, that intelligence analysts could stand to learn a few things from real world journalistic practice. Stay tuned.
The Battle for Tora Bora
If you haven’t already read Peter Bergen’s TNR piece on the late 2001 battle for Tora Bora, Afghanistan, you should. It’s a page turner, and offers a “definitive account” of “how Osama bin Laden slipped from our grasp.” It definitely lives up to the strapline. In my opinion, it’s also a fine example of good use of source material, as Bergen plumbs the wealth of memoirs published since then by key players.
Excerpt:
What really happened at Tora Bora? Not long after the battle ended, the answer to that question would become extremely clouded. Americans perceived the Afghan war as a stunning victory, and the failure at Tora Bora seemed like an unfortunate footnote to an otherwise upbeat story. By 2004, with George W. Bush locked in a tough reelection battle, some U.S. officials were even asserting, inaccurately, that bin Laden himself may not have been present at the battle.
The real history of Tora Bora is far more disturbing. Having reconstructed the battle–based on interviews with the top American ground commander, three Afghan commanders, and three CIA officials; accounts by Al Qaeda eyewitnesses that were subsequently published on jihadist websites; recollections of captured survivors who were later questioned by interrogators or reporters; an official history of the Afghan war by the U.S. Special Operations Command; an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and visits to the battle sites themselves–I am convinced that Tora Bora constitutes one of the greatest military blunders in recent U.S. history. It is worth revisiting now not just in the interest of historical accuracy, but also because the story contains valuable lessons as we renew our push against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Read the rest here.
MICHAEL A. INNES 