Afghan Hands – The Blog

A little over a week ago, I made a return visit to the ISAF webpages to poke around. It looks like some changes have been in the works. The website, which was pretty static before, is all swish now, and comes equipped with a social media dashboard in the footer where readers can subscribe to Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr (but no Twitter) feeds. It’s also got a new Afghan Hands blog, which carries “updates from Leaders and Troops across Afghanistan”.

So far, though, it looks like ISAF has only partially embraced the vigorous public diplomacy ethic espoused by NATO SecGen Anders Fogh Rassmussen and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral Jim Stavridis. Judging by the  content of the few posts that are already up at Afghan Hands, ISAF is using this as essentially press-release-by-another-name, which is completely redundant, not to mention unnecessary: officially sanctioned, edited, and command-vetted information can be and is readily pushed to the web in other formats, and pushing it as blog content when it’s not doesn’t add credibility. If anything, in the realm of social media, it demonstrates limited understanding of appropriate and convincing uses of such technologies. There’s also no date-time stamp on individual entries, which is a small point but just as fundamental, and bad practice in any domain of publishing, whether it’s public affairs/public information, blogging, intelligence, or what have you.

To my note to ISAF Public Affairs suggesting that a date-time stamp would be really helpful, no reply. I’m going to assume for now that these are all just growing pains, and that the wrinkles are still being ironed out. NATO and ISAF are in a position to make the Afghan Hands blog a welcome and authoritative hub for information and discussion. It would be disappointing, to say the least, if they don’t make the most of an otherwise golden opportunity – and more than a little ironic, given recent arguments from MGen Mike Flynn, the ISAF intelligence chief, that intelligence analysts could stand to learn a few things from real world journalistic practice. Stay tuned.

Omnivore 01/10/09

Towards a New Strategic Concept For NATO, Klaus Wittman, NATO Defense College

The Evolution of Armed Groups, David H. Sacko et al., SSRN Conflict Studies Abstracts

Analyzing Australia’s Public Sphere Initiative, Palantir Staff, Analysis Blog/Palantir Government

HASC Assessment of the Human Terrain System, Editors, Small Wars Journal

Pentagon Pushes For Unblinking Surveillance, Christian Lowe, Defense Tech

Surveillance State “A Good Thing”, Brian Wheeler, BBC News

Obama and McChrystal Don’t Talk? Good, Says Army Historian, Noah Schachtman, Danger Room/Wired

Omnivore 30/09/09

Daily Brief: 30 Afghans Killed in Kandahar Roadside Bomb, Katherine Tiedemann, AfPak Channel/Foreign Policy

You Don’t ALWAYS Have to Escalate, Joshua Foust, Registan.net

Balkh Power Struggle Leaves Locals Fearful, Ahmad Kawoosh, Institute for War & Peace Reporting

Ballot Uncertainty Fuels Cynicism in Helmand, Mohammad Ilyas Dayee, Institute for War & Peace Reporting

First Strategic Flight in Support of ISAF, NATO Newsroom

Now Playing in Swat, Jason Tanner, At War/New York Times

Apparently There’s a Taliban Problem in Quetta

Now this is interesting:

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — As American troops move deeper into southern Afghanistan to fight Taliban insurgents, U.S. officials are expressing new concerns about the role of fugitive Taliban leader Mohammad Omar and his council of lieutenants, who reportedly plan and launch cross-border strikes from safe havens around the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta.

But U.S. officials acknowledge they know relatively little about the remote and arid Pakistani border region, have no capacity to strike there, and have few windows into the turbulent mix of Pashtun tribal and religious politics that has turned the area into a sanctuary for the Taliban leaders, who are known collectively as the Quetta Shura.

Pakistani officials, in turn, have been accused of allowing the Taliban movement to regroup in the Quetta area, viewing it as a strategic asset rather than a domestic threat, while the army has been heavily focused on curbing violent Islamist extremists in the northwest border region hundreds of miles away.

As a result, Pakistani and foreign analysts here said, Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province, has suddenly emerged as an urgent but elusive new target as Washington grapples with the Taliban’s rapidly spreading arc of influence and terror across Afghanistan.

According to Anne W. Patterson, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, “In the past, we focused on al-Qaeda because they were a threat to us. The Quetta Shura mattered less to us because we had no troops in the region… Now our troops are there on the other side of the border, and the Quetta Shura is high on Washington’s list.”

The Taliban Quetta shura has always been a recognized problem. Well, maybe not always, since that’s a pretty long time. But it’s certainly been recognized as a significant part – maybe the most significant part – of the Taliban command and control structure for a good long while.

Bernard Finel is right about this:  it’s about new priorities, not new facts. It’s about McChrystal going for the Taliban throat. The problem with Quetta is that it isn’t in Afghanistan; and with the NATO mission in Afghanistan, is that its remit stops at the Durand Line, regardless of how significant a problem cross-border sanctuaries might be. So, if we’re getting serious about this, we might have something more to look forward to than just drone strikes; think more along the lines of  the B-52 strikes into Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War.

UPDATE: I exaggerate slightly… but I do wonder what getting serious about something like Quetta would involve. There’s room, I think, for serious comparison of the costs and consequences of cross-border escalation.