The View From the Veranda

Last week I gave a talk to some students at the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), at the University of Leeds. I’ve been an honorary Visiting Research Fellow with POLIS since April 2006, and it’s a rare occasion when I’m actually on-site. In fact, this was only the second time, the first being a talk I gave in late 2007. Then, I was still a serving staff officer with NATO, and my talk was about a book I’d just published. This time, I was speaking as an academic, recently resigned from NATO service, and offering students my observations on what it’s like to be a functionary in an International Organization. Despite working in some very interesting places – Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghansitan, as well as Western Europe – I couldn’t honestly claim to know much about them, and my own perceptions of those experiences are very much “the view from the veranda.”

That phrase is lifted from an article, written by Belgian academic Julian Eckl and published in International Political Sociology, entitled “Responsible Scholarship After Leaving the Veranda: Normative Issues Faced by Field Researchers – and Armchair Scientists.” Reading it was part of a broader effort to understand how the infrastructure of military interventions conflicts with the drive for ethnographic detail and context about states that host them. More importantly, I think it goes straight to the heart of knowledge claims. Debates on how we come to know the things we think we know – epistemological assumptions about the nature of research and understanding – are nothing new. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the problems are acute: headquarters life has been widely portrayed as  a disconnected bubble – an alien, hermetic imposition that squats amid the local environment while employing anthropologists and other social scientists to fill in the blanks on local culture.

Baghdad’s Green Zone, the barricaded home of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), has been a particular focus of such reporting. There, “imperial life in the emerald city” raises uncomfortable questions about just how much visiting advisors can learn and achieve – even those afforded a full year or more on the ground, and no matter how exotically qualified they might be. A number of journalists have been quick to point out the problem. New York Times reporter Dexter Filkins lived in Baghdad for almost four years, from the 2003 Invasion to the height of the insurgency in late 2006. In his memoir, The Forever War, he wrote “It was in the Green Zone that I would think the war was lost. I didn’t think about losing when I was outside – when I was in Iraq.” In The Assassin’s Gate, George Packer, the New Yorker staff writer, described the almost surreal disconnect that came with moving from one world to the next: “I went back and forth between the Green and Red Zones, between the CPA and Iraq, feeling almost dizzy at the transition, two separate realities existing on opposite sides of concrete and wire.”

What Packer and Filkins described in their respective books is almost identical to my own sense that the distance between observer and observed is infinitely elastic. In September 2001, the same month that Al Qaeda’s terrorists visited havoc on Manhattan, human rights activist and Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Samantha Power published an article in The Atlantic on the Rwanda Genocide of 1994. It’s opening section was titled “People Sitting In Offices,” an allusion to the bureaucratic penchant of far-away politicians in Washington and New York to second-guess the reports and judgments of field-based observers. The irony is thick: after living and working at both ends of the food chain, I often found myself sitting behind the protective barrier of a desktop monitor, in Sarajevo, Pristina, Kabul, reading reports from the field and second-guessing the facts they purported to convey. I wasn’t far away; I was right around the corner. People sitting in offices, as it turns out, don’t need to be squirreled away in bunkers on the Potomac to do their damage.

And so it’s with no small amount of skepticism about what can be “known”, one way or the other, that I read work like Eckl’s. His premise is, I think, straightforward and uncontroversial. “Ethnographic  methods like participant observation differ significantly from other methods,” the article’s abstract states, “since they explicitly blur the boundary between theory and practice; this blurring requires researchers to carefully evaluate their conflicting responsibilities to the people studied, to the scientific community, and to themselves.” Sure.  “Many of the insights generated in ethnology are relevant for political scientists, too, especially for those political scientists who are prepared to ‘‘leave the veranda’’ and want to put ethnographic methods to use, but also for those who prefer to remain in the position of an ‘‘armchair’’ researcher.” Still fine.

It’s Eck’s more practical recommendations that feel, well… awkward. Scholarly “objectivity” and “neutrality” are laudable goals for researchers, and achieving even some semblance of them is the height of methodological rigor. But when politics enters the picture, things get more complicated. At issue then is whether scholars should proactively seek to limit access to their research findings rather than allow some potential future misuse of their work. Eckl thinks so. He also makes an interesting case for the idea that “the field” has, traditionally, represented very different things to anthropologists and to political scientists, and that the pressures of co-option either way must be resisted. He recommends reliance on documentary evidence as one way of avoiding the perils of “going native”; as a trained historian, I see that as a red herring of sorts. What Eckl doesn’t do, unfortunately, is reconcile the worlds of the anthropologist and the political scientist, of the field observer and the deskbound researcher. There is real and social distance that separates people sitting in offices from their grubby counterparts living and breathing outside the wire. We need to understand both, and to value both.

Eckl, J. (2008). “Responsible Scholarship After Leaving the Veranda: Normative Issues Faced by Field Researchers-and Armchair Scientists.” International Political Sociology, 2 (3), 185-203 DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00044.x

Originally published at CTlab.

Primary and Secondary Source Management

Despite all sorts of professional involvement in data mining and knowledge development/management/exploitation, it hasn’t translated well to how I manage my personal files at home. I’ve been collecting primary and secondary research materials for years, but somehow never really used any form of software or tool to manage it all. File folders and file naming conventions, that’s about it. Now that my library of PDFs, Word docs, saved emails and the like has grown to silly proportions, and now that I’ve got the time to focus on my PhD and book projects, the old ways have got to go.

Over the last week, I’ve been researching two types of product: computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) like Atlas, NUDist/NVivo, Ethnograph, and the CDC’s E-Z Text, among others; and bibliographical/reference software like EndNote, Reference Manager, and Sente. The former are much more complex tools, involve a steep learning curve, and feature some interesting possibilities – notably coding functions. The latter are much more basic – I want to say that they lend themselves well to secondary source management, whereas CAQDAS is for primary source exploitation.

Two things come to mind. First, I find myself resisting what feels like a technological trap, ie. locking my data into any particular tool and its capabilities, and in turn find myself favoring something simpler. Export functions can mitigate some of that, so obviously a must-have feature.  Second, distinctions between primary and secondary sources are harder to maintain in discourse analysis – so I find myself wanting some of the CAQDAS coding functions in my reference software. Not a show-stopper, but something to think about, especially as I read more on all of this.

Potential Genetic Weapons?

This, via SSRN’s Conflict Studies Abstracts:

Developing an Analytical Framework for Genetic Warfare Policy

R.E. Burnett

ABSTRACT: Within the general notion of biological WMDs is a weapon that has been least discussed – the potential genetic weapon. Technologies that have been evolving from basic research into the molecular biology of genes and DNA/RNA are now providing us with the knowledge necessary to create new kinds of weapons that pose a strategic dilemma for the United States and its allies. This project will investigate the strategic environment of genetic warfare – notably the notion of the human adaptation of natural disease events as applied to state and non-state conduct in the contest for political and economic power and influence. Specifically, we seek to augment the security literature with regard to the conceptualization of the strategy which will hopefully provide deterrence and, if necessary, a successful defense against genetic weapons. To accomplish this task, we must integrate the historical and current strategic doctrine of biological WMDs in American doctrine and thinking, and the evolving literature in genetic science and epidemiology. An important finding in this analysis will be the growing importance of genetic forensic epidemiology is becoming a principle national security tool .

Furthermore, it will be established that the preeminent threat of biological warfare in the future – a more rational and lethal form of disease – one that threatens to nullify our decades old disease therapy model of vaccine development and deployment – is slowly leading futurist thinkers to resurrect Eugenics as a new model of science-based national security. Specifically – the argument will made that human enhancement may be the only path toward a protected human population in a future world of radically new diseases. Genetically enhanced pathogens – once posited – deconstructed – and placed within a genetic and political construct – can be combined with the growing logic of eugenics as suggested by Dr. James Watson, Dr. Francis Crick, and other aggressive utilitarian-oriented scientist/engineers who are leading these fields today. The genetically enhanced pathogen can only be resisted and/or defeated by the genetically enhanced human being. This sentence portrays the logic of a potential eugenics future – one that continues to arise from the combination of advancing genetic science and technology to the task of terrorism, warfare, and weaponology. To this logic – we will seek to establish a formal ethical analysis and conclusion for the policy and scholarly community.

 It is important to note that most of the thinking on biological war in the unclassified literature to date has occurred in the medical community. There is advantage to this in that our medical scientists and physicians are the ones who will provide the basic research needed to generate technological solutions to such weapons. Therefore, the research that we seek to conduct in this project is of clear importance. The task of this research is to integrate the knowledge of how to defend against a range of international and national actors from the security literature with the knowledge from the medical and biological literature of how genetic weapons will work for/against those actors and the United States. In this sense, the outcome of this research will be to establish a dialogue on the strategic environment of genetic warfare informed by the knowledge and corresponding technologies of molecular biology. What is possible regarding the creation and use of genetic weapons will help to determine the corresponding political, economic, and technological strategies for defending against them. Too – the ethical dimension of human genetic enhancement – as the direct operational juxtaposition to the empirical record of scientific work on pathogen genetic enhancement – causes us to write a formal statement about the specter of a renewed call for some form of eugenics – this time as a response to the need for the state to provide for the genetic security of the American population.

Omnivore 24/09/09

Tie Troops To Progress on Afghanistan’s Corruption, Brookings Institute

Should the United States Withdraw From Afghanistan? Cato Institute

A “Better War” in Afghanistan, Center for a New American Security

Shape, Clear, Hold and Build: “Uncertain Lessons of the Afghan and Iraq Wars”, Centre for Security & Int’l Studies

Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign, New America Foundation

President Asif Ali Zardari Address, International Institute for Strategic Studies

The Will To Intervene (W2I) Report, Montreal Institute For Genocide & Human Rights Studies

The Congolese Elite and the Fragmented City, LSE Crisis States Research Center

Regional Arrangements and Security Challenges, LSE Crisis States Research Center

Discussion on Drug Syndicates, Institute For Security Studies