Omnivore 09/10/09

Testing Obama’s Doctrine, David Ignatus, Washington Post

Civilian, Military Officials At Odds Over Resources For Afghanistan, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post

Taliban Announces That It Poses No International Threat, Jason Burke, Guardian

This Week At War: Where is Jones? Robert Haddick, Foreign Policy

Britain’s Strategy, Britain’s Place, David Betz, Kings of War

NSF Political Science Program vs. Human Terrain System, Drew Conway, Zero Intelligence Agents

The Kind of Program A City Is, Adam Greenfield, Speedbird

Former Agent Exposes Communist Regime’s Methods of Infiltration in the West, Xin Fei, The Epoch Times

Apparently There’s a Taliban Problem in Quetta

Now this is interesting:

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — As American troops move deeper into southern Afghanistan to fight Taliban insurgents, U.S. officials are expressing new concerns about the role of fugitive Taliban leader Mohammad Omar and his council of lieutenants, who reportedly plan and launch cross-border strikes from safe havens around the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta.

But U.S. officials acknowledge they know relatively little about the remote and arid Pakistani border region, have no capacity to strike there, and have few windows into the turbulent mix of Pashtun tribal and religious politics that has turned the area into a sanctuary for the Taliban leaders, who are known collectively as the Quetta Shura.

Pakistani officials, in turn, have been accused of allowing the Taliban movement to regroup in the Quetta area, viewing it as a strategic asset rather than a domestic threat, while the army has been heavily focused on curbing violent Islamist extremists in the northwest border region hundreds of miles away.

As a result, Pakistani and foreign analysts here said, Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province, has suddenly emerged as an urgent but elusive new target as Washington grapples with the Taliban’s rapidly spreading arc of influence and terror across Afghanistan.

According to Anne W. Patterson, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, “In the past, we focused on al-Qaeda because they were a threat to us. The Quetta Shura mattered less to us because we had no troops in the region… Now our troops are there on the other side of the border, and the Quetta Shura is high on Washington’s list.”

The Taliban Quetta shura has always been a recognized problem. Well, maybe not always, since that’s a pretty long time. But it’s certainly been recognized as a significant part – maybe the most significant part – of the Taliban command and control structure for a good long while.

Bernard Finel is right about this:  it’s about new priorities, not new facts. It’s about McChrystal going for the Taliban throat. The problem with Quetta is that it isn’t in Afghanistan; and with the NATO mission in Afghanistan, is that its remit stops at the Durand Line, regardless of how significant a problem cross-border sanctuaries might be. So, if we’re getting serious about this, we might have something more to look forward to than just drone strikes; think more along the lines of  the B-52 strikes into Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War.

UPDATE: I exaggerate slightly… but I do wonder what getting serious about something like Quetta would involve. There’s room, I think, for serious comparison of the costs and consequences of cross-border escalation.

Omnivore 28/09/09

The Taliban in Their Own Words, Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, Newsweek

What Shapes Sanctions, David Makovsky, The New Republic

A Just Withdrawal, Michael Walzer and Nicolaus Mills, The New Republic

The Last Days of the Polymath, Edward Carr, Intelligent Life

Lead Poisoning Found in 121 Children in China, AP/New York Times

NATO and Mauritania Resume Full Cooperation, NATO Newsroom

Modelling and Simulation Used to Enhance NATO, Carla Burdt, Allied Command Transformation

Is Hollywood Finally TakingVirtual Worlds Seriously? Max Burns, Pixels and Polixy

The L.A. Times Contemplates America’s Avatar Addiction, Max Burns, Pixels and Policy

What if Author Bios Were Brutally Honest? Daniel Drezner, Foreign Policy

Radio Free Swat Valley

I read this op-ed in the International Herald Tribune over lunch today. More important than IHT’s crisp, newly revamped layout, and more important than the snappy title of the piece,  Douglas J. Feith and Justin Polin note a missed Af-Pak  stratcom opportunity:

ON March 5, in the outskirts of Peshawar, Pakistan, forces believed to be affiliated with the Taliban bombed the shrine of Rahman Baba (born around 1650), the most revered Pashtun poet. The attack evokes one of the grosser Taliban outrages from the pre-9/11 era: the dynamiting in 2001 of the enormous stone Buddhas in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Valley.

It’s interesting that in the reams of studies on insurgent and terrorist messaging – which have tended to privilege the web as the virtual insurgent’s platform of choice – low tech radio’s been so neglected. Event the recent Crisis Group report on Taliban propaganda, which looked at the subject in depth, missed the boat on the importance of radio to guerrilla forces operating in large, sprawling geographies where high rates of illiteracy prevail. Anyway.

Feith and Polin:

If it had the equipment and personnel for the job, the United States could broadcast radio programs for the Pashtuns commemorating Rahman Baba’s life and poetry, thus helping to revive the collective memory of Sufism and inspiring opposition to the Taliban. Other programs could highlight the cultural and physical devastation wrought by the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The United States conducted impressive strategic communications during the cold war. Radio Free Europe, Voice of America and other programs conveyed information and ideas that contributed to the discrediting and ultimate defeat of Soviet communism.

Pakistan’s Islamist extremists apparently know the value of strategic communications. They preach and broadcast, understanding that every non-extremist school they close, every artist they force to move, every moderate tribal leader they kill and every Sufi shrine they destroy can increase their powers of intimidation and persuasion.